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INTRODUCTION
The police can secretly track your every physical movement,
listen to your private conversations, and collect data from your
cell phone—all without first getting a warrant based on probable
cause, signed off by a judge. “WTF?!” you text. Indeed, this
practice by law enforcement using portable Stingray cell-site
simulators as digital surveillance tools has also raised the
eyebrows of privacy advocates and state and federal courts across
the country in the past few years.
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Stingrays, sometimes also referred to as Triggerfish, IMSI
Catchers, and Digital Analyzers, are the military grade cell-site
simulators used by federal and local law enforcement to
electronically track individuals suspected of criminal activity or
to conduct mass surveillance on groups of unsuspecting people or
particular areas.1 Stingrays, which were originally developed for
military and intelligence agencies for use overseas, act as phony
cell phone towers by sending powerful electronic signals to all cell
phones within their range to trigger an automatic response from
nearby phones.2
Truly, Stingrays epitomize how new
technologies are transforming the experience, regulation, and
definition of personal privacy today. Lacking guidance on this
issue, courts must choose to apply, adapt, or reject settled
doctrinal rules, and interpret recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, in deciding whether the use of Stingrays violates
the Fourth Amendment.
Because Fourth Amendment
surveillance cases tend to crawl along the appellate process at a
snail’s pace, it will likely take years for this issue to reach the
Supreme Court. In the meantime, lower courts are left wrestling
with the constitutionality of cell-simulator use, and legislatures
continue to debate about their efficacy.
This Review discusses two timely and insightful books
examining the changing relationship between privacy and the
Fourth Amendment in the digital era. Part I discusses the
tensions between the need to protect privacy rights and the
slowly evolving legal landscape during a time of rapidly changing
technology, to introduce David Gray’s The Fourth Amendment in
an Age of Surveillance.3 His book explains how the Fourth
Amendment, though embattled, can have a prominent role in
1
See Alicia Lu, What is StingRay, The Creepy Device Chicago Police: “Used to
Spy” On Eric Garner Protesters?, BUSTLE (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/
articles/53050-what-is-stingray-the-creepy-device-chicago-police-used-to-spy-on-ericgarner-protesters.
2
See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen
Register and Less Than a Wire Tap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How
Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities,
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 147–48 (2013) (claiming “the unmediated nature of
StingRay technology makes it essentially ‘invisible’ in operation and leaves behind
no retrievable trace that is subject to future detection” and that “the StingRay,
masquerading as the cell site with the strongest signal, receives the information
immediately and directly as it is communicated by the mobile phones, leaving no
trace of interception with the third party provider”).
3
DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017).
Gray is a Professor of Law at the University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School
of Law.
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twenty-first century discussions of privacy, technology, and
surveillance.4
Gray’s analysis is engaged to broaden the
conversation about Stingray technology. This section analyzes a
sampling of the litigation over Stingrays and highlights the
divergent, sometimes vibrant, opinions held by courts about the
viability of Katz v. United States5 in current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Part II analyzes two important Stingray surveillance cases,
State v. Andrews6 and United States v. Patrick,7 speculating
further about a future Supreme Court case where a majority
looks disfavorably upon law enforcement’s use of Stingray
surveillance technology.
Part III shifts to discuss Barry
Friedman’s book, Unwarranted: Policing Without Permission,8 to
explore why better police accountability is needed in a modern
world. Citizens want both safe neighborhoods and less police
misconduct at a time when the police are conducting searches
with neither warrants nor probable cause.9 Unwarranted is a
critical dissection of the debates about policing, and a clarion call
to take responsibility. At the core, Friedman argues that
limitations must be placed on the unfettered discretion afforded
to the police when they conduct traffic stops and stop and frisks
as well as when they use surveillance technology.
Part IV builds upon the background established by the Age
of Surveillance and Unwarranted to present an argument that
curbing police authority to arbitrarily stop individuals is now
more difficult in light of Utah v. Strieff,10 a wrongly decided
decision dealing a serious blow to the exclusionary rule.
Part V discusses the unfettered discretion exercised by the
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia
(“MPD”) when embarking on indiscriminate searches using
4
Gray’s book is divided into six sections, touching on the age of surveillance, the
Fourth Amendment, and competing proposals and Fourth Amendment remedies.
5
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6
134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
7
842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2016).
8
BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION (2017).
Friedman is a Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.
9
Friedman’s book is divided into three parts covering democratic policing,
constitutional policing, and twenty-first century policing. Democratic policing
addresses the police working in secret and an ineffective legislature and court.
Constitutional policing analyzes the police conducting searches without warrants
and probable cause, and discriminatory searches. Twenty-first century policing
explores surveillance technology, counterterrorism, and national security.
10
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
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Veritrax GPS records to look for potential suspects who may be
on supervised probation. This issue has received scant attention
because the increase in the number of people on community
supervision, or “mass supervision,” through probation and parole
is largely an afterthought.
I.

THE JONES CASE AND THE STINGRAY SURVEILLANCE DEBATE

“[Stingrays] haven’t contributed anything meaningful to
counterterrorism efforts. Instead, they have largely served as
police surveillance and information sharing nodes for law
enforcement efforts targeting the frequent subjects of
police attention: Black and brown people, immigrants,
dissidents, and the poor.”11
Jones v. United States illustrates the delicate balancing of
privacy rights with the need for police to investigate a crime.12 In
a 2017 case of first impression in Washington, D.C. challenging
the warrantless use of cell-site simulator technology, Jones was
convicted of robbing and raping two women.13 Jones stole a cell
phone from one of the women.14 The MPD, without first getting a
warrant, relied on a Stingray to track down the phone’s
location.15 The cell-site simulator led the police to a row of cars
parked near the Minnesota Avenue Metro Station where they
found and arrested Jones.16 Jones was convicted of various
offenses “arising out of two alleged incidents of sexual assault
and robbery at knifepoint.”17
The MPD argued that a warrant was not necessary because
there were exigent circumstances present.18 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the MPD’s use of Stingray

11
Mike Maharrey, Oregon Bill Would Ban Warrantless Stingray Spying, Help
Hinder Federal Surveillance, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2019/01/oregon-bill-would-ban-warrantlessstingray-spying-help-hinder-federal-surveillance/ (quoting Nasser Eledroos, Oops–
Did Police Accidentically Reveal Unconstitutional Surveillance When They Tweeted a
Screenshot? AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:30 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/rights-protesters/oops-did-police-accidentallyreveal-unconstitutional-surveillance).
12
168 A.3d 703 (D.C. 2017).
13
Id. at 707–08.
14
Id. at 708.
15
Id. at 707–09.
16
Id. at 708–09.
17
Id. at 707.
18
Id. at 710–11.
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technology violated Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights.19 Judge
Beckwith, writing for the panel majority, determined that it was
unconstitutional for the government to use a Stingray to find
Jones before first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.20
Beckwith was especially concerned with the actively deceptive
nature of the Stingray and the lack of applicable law on these
devices.21
Judge Thompson argued in his dissenting opinion that
society is not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in a
phone’s location, and thus Jones, “traveling on the public roads
with a powered-on, stolen cell phone,” could not have held a
reasonable expectation that the location of the cell phone would
be private.22 In an aside, Thompson drew a distinction between
cell phone owners’ two-fold privacy expectations: people expect
privacy in the actual contents saved in their cell phones, yet
victims of cell phone theft would be willing to give up their
expectation of privacy if a Stingray is used to track down their
stolen phone.23
These opposing opinions about the extent of Fourth
Amendment protection between the two Washington, D.C. jurists
sets the stage for Gray’s commentary in Age of Surveillance
about big data information gathering, including the prevalence of
cell-site simulators and their surveillance of almost all cell
phones. Gray’s commentary uncovers the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment to reveal its historical guarantees of
collective security against threats of “unreasonable searches and
seizures,” and it ends with concrete solutions to the current
Fourth Amendment crisis.
At the outset, indiscriminate big data information gathering
by the government is prevalent. By definition, big data are
“technologies and programs that aggregate, store, and analyze”
varied source material.24 Big data programs have access to
information sources including credit histories, criminal records,
property ownership, consumer transactions, and other personal
19

Id. at 707.
Id. The court ruled on the issue of whether the use of a cell-site simulator
constituted a search, even though the trial court declined to do so; the trial court
focused instead on the issues of standing, exigent circumstances, and inevitable
discovery. Id. at 710.
21
Id. at 720.
22
Id. at 735–36 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
23
Id. at 730, 737–38.
24
GRAY, supra note 3, at 38.
20
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information.25
Big data’s collection methodology “leverages
modern information gathering, aggregation, storage, and
analysis technologies.”26 Big data affects the abilities of subjects
to control access to often personal and sensitive information,
impacts freedom of movement—no fly lists, global-positioningsystem tracking of probationers—and affects the “ability of
people to get jobs, secure housing, and access credit.”27
While “these kinds of restraints on freedom fall short of
traditional full custodial arrests,” Gray says they still are
“seizures” because “they place persons in the grasps of state
power.”28 He further asserts that the government’s “unfettered
discretion to deploy and use big data programs threatens the
Fourth Amendment rights of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, or effects against unreasonable search
or seizure.”29 Through this lens, Gray considers Stingrays as the
most notorious of the broad tracking technologies exploiting
personal electronic devices.30 Cell-site simulators engage in
invasive searches when they indiscriminately monitor
communication devices.31 The deployment of Stingrays has
become commonplace, and they are most prevalent in urban
areas and “high crime” neighborhoods.32
The benign appearance of Stingrays disguises their invidious
nature. Stingrays resemble large metallic radio transmitters, are
the size of suitcases, and can be carried by hand, placed in a car,
or mounted on a drone or airplane.33 Stingrays capture text,
numbers of outgoing calls, emails, serial numbers, identification
information, GPS locations, actual contents of conversations, and
other raw and detailed information from unsuspecting phones
and they can track the locations of targets and non-targets in

25

Id. at 41.
Id. at 263.
27
Id. at 264.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 263–75.
30
Id. at 4, 33–34, 261–63.
31
Id. at 261–62.
32
Id. at 4–5.
33
See id. at 33–34; Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret
StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell
Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–15 (2014); Lisa Bartley, Investigation: Law Enforcement
Use Secret ‘Stingray’ Devices to Track Cell Phone Signals, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS
(Dec. 3, 2014), https://abc7.com/news/investigation-law-enforcement-use-secretdevices-to-track-cell-phone-signals/421190/.
26
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apartments, cars, buses, and on streets.34 They can even make
the tracked device send text messages and make calls.35 The
collateral consequences resulting from their use includes the
disruption of cell service to phones in the form of service outages,
blocked and dropped calls, and the complete draining of a cell
phone’s battery.36
To be fair, there are legitimate uses of Stingrays. Stingrays
have proven to be useful in tracking down dangerous fugitives on
crime sprees, including the suspect responsible for four Texas
bombings last year.37 They are invaluable tools for intelligence
gathering in terrorism cases when there is an immediate threat
to human life and for other emergency situations. More often
than not though, Stingrays are not being used for investigations
of serious crimes like murders, kidnappings, rapes, shootings,
aggravated assaults with serious injuries, capturing fugitives,
and robberies.38 On the contrary, Stingrays are used in run of
the mill matters such as locating stolen cell phones or scanning
from the skies over amusement parks and along the border.39
34

GRAY, supra note 3, at 34–35, 38.
See, e.g., Jeremy H. D’Amico, Cellphones, Stingrays, and Searches! An Inquiry
into the Legality of Cellular Location Information, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1252, 1296
(2016) (noting that these devices can “intercept” calls and text messages); Andrew
Hemmer, Duty of Candor in the Digital Age: The Need For Heightened Judicial
Supervision of Stingray Searches, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 295, 296 (2016) (describing
the tracking abilities of Stingrays and how they can “hijack[]” a phone to perform
calls and texts disguised as the targeted phones); Austin McCullough, StingRay
Searches and the Fourth Amendment Implications of Modern Cellular Surveillance,
53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 41–42 (2016) (same); Pell & Soghoian, supra note
33, at 14.
36
See Brian Barrett, The Baltimore PD’s Race Bias Extends to High-Tech
Spying, Too, WIRED (Aug. 16, 2016, 8:01 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/08/
baltimore-pds-race-bias-extends-high-tech-spying; Colin Daileda, The Police
Technology Intensifying Racial Discrimination, MASHABLE (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://mashable-com-cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/mashable.com/2016/10/03/policetechnology-surveillance-racial-bias.amp.
37
See Inside The “Fatal Mistake” That Led Police to the Austin Parcel Bombing
Suspect, ABC NEWS (last updated Mar. 21, 2018, 10:38 PM), https://www.abc.
net.au/news/2018-03-22/how-a-phone-steered-the-hunt-for-texas-parcelbomber/9576040.
38
See Marlan Hetherly, Judge Rules Surveillance Info Collected by Police
Stingrays Can Remain Confidential, WBFO (Apr. 12, 2018), http://news.wbfo.org/
post/judge-rules-surveillance-info-collected-police-stingrays-can-remain-confidential.
39
See Ashley Carman, Cops in Disneyland’s Homeland Used Stingray
Surveillance Devices, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/
1/28/10859596/california-anaheim-disneyland-police-stingray-spy (describing
Anaheim Police Department’s use of Stingrays and “dirtbox” surveillance devices
within range of sixteen million Disneyland visitors); George Joseph, Racial
Disparities in Police “Stingray” Surveillance, Mapped, CITYLAB (Oct. 18, 2016),
35
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Absent any specified protocol about their Stingray use or
judicial oversight, law enforcement freely relies on Stingrays to
either target and track particular individual protests or to mass
collect phone numbers in high crime areas.40 Such threats to
individual privacy are arguably the equivalent of the intrusive
and indiscriminate searches that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to prevent. In spite of these concerns, the questionable
use of Stingrays has become routine. The Baltimore Police
Department, the heaviest user of Stingrays in the country,
deployed Stingrays thousands of times in low-income African
American sections of the city in ninety percent of Stingray
incidents mapped during the riots following the death of Freddie
Gray at the hands of the Baltimore police, and during Black
Lives Matter demonstrations.41 Known Stingray operations in
Milwaukee and Tallahassee are also heavily concentrated in
non-white, poor communities.42
Unfortunately, an accurate and complete evaluation of the
efficacy of Stingray programs cannot be achieved due to the lack
of transparency about their purchase and use. Aware of this,
judges and elected officials are pushing back more and more
against their unfettered use and the often cloak-and-dagger
shenanigans that come along with that.43 For instance, when law
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/racial-disparities-in-police-stingraysureveillance-mapped/502715/; Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?,
ACLU (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (identifying Customs and
Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement as known federal
agencies using Stingrays).
40
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High Crime Area”
Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1590–92 (2008) (analyzing
and critiquing reviewing courts’ consideration of an area as a “high crime area” as
an evaluation factor determining reasonableness of Fourth Amendment stops); Kate
Klonick, Stingrays: Not Just for Feds! How Local Law Enforcement Uses an Invasive,
Unreliable Surveillance Tool, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_la
w-enforcement_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.html.
41
See Barrett, supra note 36; Daileda, supra note 36; Joseph, supra note 39;
Andy Martino, Black Lives Matter Activists are Convinced the NYPD Hacked Their
Phones, THE OUTLINE (Apr. 7, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://theoutline.com/post/1360/
black-lives-matter-police-surveillance-the-cops-hacked-their-phones?.
42
See Joseph, supra note 39.
43
See Hemmer, supra note 35, at 300–01 (calling for heightened judicial review
of Stingray searches which infringe upon civil liberties); Tom Jackman, D.C. Appeals
Court Poised To Rule on Whether Police Need Warrants for Cellphone Tracking,
WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/
2017/04/18/d-c-appeals-court-poised-to-rule-on-whether-police-need-warrants-for-
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enforcement officers submit applications for search warrants,
they often disingenuously leave out any references to the use of
cell-site simulators.44 When questioned, agencies using Stingrays
are quick to halfheartedly explain that “public revelation of their
technological capabilities threaten to compromise the efficacy of
surveillance.”45 Sometimes when backed into a corner, agencies
will just drop their prosecution rather than spill the beans about
the Stingray and risk a breach of the manufacturer’s mandatory
non-disclosure agreement.46 Gray responds by advocating for
statutory regulations for cell-site simulators, along with a
warrant requirement as a counterbalance to the unfettered
discretion of law enforcement:
In light of the surveillance capacities of cell site simulators,
their widespread use, the paucity of statutory regulations, and
the utter absence of constitutional limitations, . . . [i]t is hard to
imagine a better example of conditions characteristic of a
surveillance state or a means and method of government
surveillance more in need of Fourth Amendment regulation.47

Essentially, Gray wants cell-site simulator regulations that
are akin to the Wiretap Act.48 Friedman similarly argues for
transparency over the use of Stingrays because they act as
wiretaps.49 Both are correct. At a minimum, the government
should be required to satisfy the exacting procedural

cellphone-tracking (reporting the secret use of cell-site simulators by police and
federal agents over the years); Spencer S. Hsu, In District, Warrantless Tracking
Requests Surge in Past 3 Years, WASH. POST, (July 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/court-warrantless-requests-totrack-cellphones-internet-use-grew-sevenfold-in-dc-in-threeyears/2017/07/18/b284ac32-6b36-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html.
44
See GRAY, supra note 3, at 36; see, e.g., Hemmer, supra note 35, at 297 (noting
that in one case, “the government failed to specify the technology that it intended to
use in executing the search warrant, leaving out crucial details related to the
device’s invasiveness and likely impact on third parties”).
45
THE CATO INSTITUTE, STINGRAY: A NEW FRONTIER IN POLICE SURVEILLANCE
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-809-revised.pdf.
46
See GRAY, supra note 3, at 36 (2017) (“In cases where defendants have
nevertheless discovered what is afoot, local prosecutors have gone so far as to drop
criminal charges in order to avoid exposing the use of cell site simulators to judicial
review.”); Howard W. Cox, StingRay Technology and Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy in the Internet of Everything, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 29, 31–32 (2016)
(reporting that “Baltimore officials agreed to seek dismissal of . . . charges” rather
than “compromis[ing] the technology” by allowing its use to be revealed in court);
Joseph, supra note 39.
47
GRAY, supra note 3, at 38.
48
See id. at 262–63.
49
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 32.
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requirements of the Wiretap Act before any Stingray use is
authorized. Pursuant to the Federal Wire Tap Act, before a
wiretap can be issued, a judge must find that “there is probable
cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed,
or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter.”50 The government must also show
that the wiretap is necessary and that the goal of the
investigation could not be achieved through normal investigative
techniques.51
Here, Friedman is most persuasive in insisting that
warrants based on probable cause be required of the government
when applying for court orders.52
The focus of Fourth
Amendment analysis, Friedman says, should be shifted from the
perspective of whether surveillance technologies threaten a
reasonable expectation of privacy to law enforcements’ unfettered
use of Stingrays, which threatens the right of the people to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.53 Gray is in
agreement, and insists that “[g]ranting this kind of unfettered
discretion would pose the same kinds of general threats to the
security of the people against unreasonable searches posed by
general warrants and writs of assistance.”54
Gray and Friedman are not outliers on this issue. There is
growing, vocal, grass-roots opposition against Stingray
surveillance by public defenders and privacy activists demanding
more transparency of police surveillance, and that the public be
allowed to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding
how Stingrays are used.55 Many observers have called for

50

18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (U.S.C. 2012).
See id. at § 2518(3)(c).
52
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 137.
53
See id. at 258; see also Amir Nasr, Poll: Little Trust That Tech Giants Will
Keep Personal Data Private, MORNINGCONSULT (Apr. 10, 2017), https://morning
consult.com/2017/04/10/poll-little-trust-tech-giants-will-keep-personal-data-private
(discussing polls reflecting the skepticism held by Americans about the ability of
internet service providers to keep their personal data private); Lee Rainie,
Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy Concerns,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-ofprivacy-concerns/ (same with regards to social media providers).
54
GRAY, supra note 3, at 262.
55
See Joseph, supra note 39.
51
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transparency of Stingray policies after the Justice Department’s
2015 decision requiring federal investigators to obtain a search
warrant from a judge to use the device.56
Outside the beltway, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin
have passed laws that protect citizens’ cell phone data, requiring
police to get a warrant to use a Stingray.57 The Oregon Senate is
considering a proposed law that blocks the warrantless use of
Stingrays to protect privacy rights.58
Likewise, the Texas
legislature is considering a warrant requirement for Stingrays,
except in emergency situations.59 New York and other states are

56

See Cox, supra note 46, at 35 (calling for Congress to draft legislation creating
a new statutory right in privacy and limiting government’s access to this data);
Robert Snell, Feds Use Anti-Terror Tool to Hunt the Undocumented, DETROIT NEWS
(May 18, 2018), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/05/
18/cell-snooping-fbi-immigrant/101859616/. Indeed, Congress should update and
create privacy laws to address law enforcement’s use of these advanced surveillance
techniques. See Editorial Board, Congress Must Reckon with the Fourth Amendment
and New Technology, WASH. POST (June 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/congress-must-reckon-with-the-fourth-amendment-and-newtechnology/2018/06/23/f95578c0-7653-11e8-9780-b1dd6a09b549_story.html (opining
that after Carpenter, Congress should step in to craft rules that clarify standards to
accommodate new technology).
57
See, e.g., Cox, supra note 46, at 31 (discussing the reaction by various state
legislatures to the use of Stingrays and remarking, “[T]welve states have passed
laws requiring law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator must be based upon a
court issued search warrant based upon probable cause”); Katherine M. Sullivan, Is
Your Smartphone Conversation Private? The Stingray Device’s Impact on Privacy in
Statutes, CATH. U. L. REV. 388, 400 (2018) (arguing for more state legislation to
protect privacy of citizens); Klonick, supra note 40; Mike Maharrey, Arizona
Committee Passes Bill to Prohibit Warrantless Stingray Spying, TENTH AMENDMENT
CENTER (Feb. 7, 2017), https://fromthetrenchesworldreport.com/arizona-committeepasses-bill-prohibit-warrantless-stingray-spying/182520; Mike Maharrey, Missouri
Committee Passes Bill to Ban Warrantless Stingray Spying, Help Hinder Federal
Surveillance, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Feb. 21, 2018), https://blog.tenth
amendmentcenter.com/2018/02/missouri-committee-passes-bill-to-ban-warrantlessstingray-spying-hinder-federal-surveillance/; Mike Maharrey, Florida Committee
Passes Bill to Ban Warrantless Stingray Spying, Help Hinder Federal Surveillance,
TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Feb. 7, 2018), https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/
2019/02/florida-committee-passes-bill-to-ban-warrantless-stingray-spying-helphinder-federal-surveillance-2/; Snell, supra note 56 (offering that states can adopt
laws requiring judicial authorization before local law enforcement is allowed to use
Stingrays, adopt laws limiting how long they can retain the data, and reserving the
use of Stingrays only for cases implicating violence or harm to human life).
58
Maharrey, supra note 11.
59
See Anna M. Tinsley, Texas Lawmakers’ Bills Would Limit Cellphone
Trackers, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.star-telegram.
com/news/politics-government/article18868620.html.
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developing similar legislation.60 On the local level, Berkeley,
Oakland, Santa Clara County, Nashville, Seattle, Somerville,
and Davis have already adopted strong laws governing the police
acquisition and use of surveillance technologies.61 All told, these
legislative measures are only the first steps in regulating
Stingrays. As discussed below, legislation means nothing unless
it has teeth and bite. Moreover, it must pass judicial muster and
contain a warrant requirement.
II. ARGUING ABOUT STINGRAYS: MORE JUDGES DISAGREE ABOUT
THE LEGALITY OF CELL-SITE SIMULATORS
This section looks at two important stingray surveillance
cases that were precursors to Jones v. United States. Some
Maryland jurists are disdainful about the use of Stingrays, while
some Chicago judges conclude that Stingrays are not invasive.
A.

Lower Courts Wrestle Onward About the Constitutionality of
Stingray Surveillance

In State v. Andrews, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
ruled in 2016 on whether the government may transform a cell
phone into a real-time tracking device without a warrant, and
the court held that the Baltimore Police Department’s use of
Hailstorm—an upgraded version of the Stingray—required a
valid search warrant based on probable cause.62 The appellate
court was the first state appellate court to order evidence
obtained using a Stingray to be suppressed.63 As with most
cell-site location information (“CSLI”) cases, the government
relied on the third-party doctrine established by United States v.
Miller, which concerned bank records,64 and Smith v. Maryland,
60

Martino, supra note 41.
See Robyn Greene, How Cities Are Reining in Out-of-Control Policing Tech,
SLATE (May 14, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/oakland-california-andother-cities-are-reining-in-out-of-control-police-technologies.html; DJ Pangburn,
Berkeley Mayor: We Passed the “Strongest” Police Surveillance Law, FAST COMPANY
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40558647/berkeley-mayor-we-passedthe-strongest-police-surveillance-law.
62
State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 350 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
63
See Cyrus Farivar, For the First Time, Federal Judge Tosses Evidence
Obtained Via Stingray, ARS TECHNICA (July 12, 2016, 9:07 PM), https://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2016/07/for-the-first-time-federal-judge-tosses-evidence-obtained-viastingray/.
64
425 U.S. 435, 438–40 (1976). In Miller, federal agents presented subpoenas to
two banks to produce financial records of the defendant. Id. at 437. The Court held
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated because there was no reasonable
61
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which concerned pen registers.65 Under the third-party doctrine,
when information is “voluntarily” given to third parties, an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information, making the Fourth Amendment inapplicable.66
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that the
government violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
by using the Hailstorm to locate him. The court viewed the
State’s actions in protecting the Hailstorm technology with the
use of an non-disclosure agreement as contrary to constitutional
principles.67 Of particular concern to the court was the potential
for unchecked use of the Hailstorm to track a cell phone’s
movement across both public and private spaces to learn about
the private and personal habits of any user.68 The court
concluded that (1) Andrews did not “assume the risk” that the
information obtained through the use of the Hailstorm device
would be shared by the service provider and that (2) the
third-party doctrine did not apply since his location data was
never transmitted to a third-party—such as a cell-service
provider—voluntarily by Andrews.69
That same year, the the Seventh Circuit sided with the
government’s use of Stingrays in United States v. Patrick,70 which
was the first time that a federal court substantively discussed
the warrantless use of a Stingray. Wisconsin police arrested
Damian Patrick while he was in a car on a public street and in
unlawful possession of a gun.71 Patrick, a state prison parolee,
had a warrant issued for his arrest for noncompliance with the
conditions of his release.72 Milwaukee police found Patrick with

expectation of privacy in financial records voluntarily conveyed to and regularly
maintained in the ordinary course of business by a bank, such as financial
statements and deposit slips. Id. at 442–43.
65
442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). In Smith, police officers were attempting to track
down a robber who had begun making obscene and harassing phone calls. Id. at 737.
The Court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in pen
registers. Id. at 745–46.
66
See Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 350–51 (2016).
67
See id. at 338.
68
Id. at 348.
69
Id. at 398–99.
70
842 F.3d 540 (2016).
71
Id. at 541.
72
Id. at 542.
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the use of cell phone data that was authorized by a second
warrant.73 Patrick’s location had been pinned down using data
from a Stingray.74
After the state conceded that the use of a cell-site simulator
was a search, Patrick argued that the location-tracking warrant
was invalid because police were required to obtain a warrant,
and that police should have revealed to the state judge who
issued the location-tracking warrant about the Stingray.75 In
affirming Patrick’s conviction, the panel majority punted on the
substantive questions about whether a warrant is required to use
the Stingray and whether a cell-site simulator is a reasonable
means of executing a warrant.76 The panel narrowly ruled that
Patrick did not have any privacy interest in a public place and
reasoned that regardless of the Stingray, Patrick was taken into
custody based on probable cause and an arrest warrant.77 In
making that determination, the panel majority paid deference to
law enforcement’s assurances that Stingrays are not invasive,
merely relying on the Department of Justice Policy Guidance
manual’s boilerplate disclaimer that cell-site simulators do not
function as a GPS locator, do not capture emails, texts, contact
lists, images, or other phone data, and do not provide subscriber
account information.78 The panel mischaracterized the prowess
of Stingrays when it suggested that Stingrays only provide the
same kind of information that can be obtained from a phone
company.79
The majority panel’s glossing over the dangers of Stingray
surveillance seemingly raised the ire of dissenting Chief Judge
Dianne Wood, who argued that the panel underestimated the
Stingray’s capabilities.80 She was especially critical of: (1) the
government’s unwillingness to be forthcoming with information
about how the Stingray was used; (2) its concealing the use of the
Stingray when seeking the warrant; and (3) the majority panel’s
“blind reliance” on the Department of Justice manual assumption
that the Milwaukee police followed proper procedures.81
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
Id. at 543–44.
Id. at 545.
Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 543–44.
See id. at 545 (Wood, J., dissenting).
Id. at 546–47.

2019]

BOOK REVIEW

339

In light of these serious concerns, Chief Judge Wood wanted
to remand the case for further fact finding concerning the
Wisconsin police’s reliance on the Stingray and the authorization
for searching Patrick’s cell phone:
It is time for the Stingray to come out of the shadows, so that its
use can be subject to the same kind of scrutiny as other
mechanisms, such as thermal imaging devices, GPS trackers,
pen registers, beepers, and the like. Its capabilities go far
beyond any of those, and cases such as Riley indicate that the
Supreme Court might take a dim view of indiscriminate use of
something that can read texts and emails, listen to
conversations, and perhaps intercept other application data
housed not just on the target’s phone, but also those of countless
innocent third parties.82

B. Reasons Why the Supreme Court Would Require a Warrant
for the Use of Stingray Surveillance Technology
This subsection expands on Chief Judge Wood’s advisement
that a future Court case may look disfavorably upon law
enforcement’s use of Stingray surveillance technology. Relying
on the pathways paved in prior key government surveillance
rulings for direction—Kyllo v. United States,83 United States v.
Jones,84 Riley v. California,85 and Carpenter v. United States86—I
predict that a majority will hold that law enforcement’s use of
cell-site simulators is subject to the Fourth Amendment, and a
warrant is required for their use.
A brief survey of the Court’s important surveillance cases of
the past two decades supports this belief. In the 2001 decision
Kyllo v. United States,87 the Court held that the use of a thermal
imaging device, aimed at a private home from a public street to
detect relative amounts of heat and obtain information about the
interior of a home, constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.88 In 2012, in United States v. Jones,89 a unanimous
82

Id. at 552.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
84
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
85
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
86
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
87
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
88
See also Andrew G. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
125, 133 (2002) (“The Supreme Court has generally failed to see any enhanced
dangers to privacy caused by rapidly changing police surveillance
technologies. . . . [T]he Court has addressed technology questions under the same
83
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Court expressed discomfort with the government’s attachment of
a GPS tracker on a jeep for twenty-eight days, which was
determined to be a “search.”90 In the 2014 consolidated case
Riley v. California,91 the Court addressed whether an officer’s
search of a defendant’s “smart phone” incident to an arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Court ruled
unanimously that police generally must obtain a warrant to
search the contents of cell phones.92 While each case involved
distinct technology and different facts, their collective rationale
fit together.
Then, Carpenter v. United States brought Katz v. United
States93 into the digital era by holding for the first time that a
person has an expectation of privacy in the whole of his or her
physical movement, and that law enforcement agencies generally
need a warrant to track suspects’ locations using CSLI.94 Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, ruled that cell phone users possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the CSLI history associated with their
cell phones.95 Accessing a person’s historical cell-site records, or
at least seven days or more of cell-site records, is a Fourth
analytical framework that it uses for resolving all Fourth Amendment search
questions.”).
89
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
90
Id. at 406. Justice Scalia sidestepped the issue of applying Katz and instead
used common law trespass theory to conclude that the Government “trespassorily”
inserted the information gathering device when it encroached on Jones’s jeep—a
protected area. Id. at 409, 411–12.
91
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
92
Id. at 403. The majority recognized the privacy interests in the kinds of vast
data stored in modern cell phones that are so persuasive today. Id. Cell phones
contain information about internet searches and browsing history and can reveal
enough personal information and private interests, in the aggregate, to reconstruct a
person’s private life. Id. at 395–96. Cell phones are miniature computers that
function as “cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries,
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers” and possess great storage
capacity, including the ability to record data even before their purchase date. Id. at
393–94. A cell phone’s capacity also allows an individual’s private life to be pieced
together through dated and detailed photos, which can be reconstructed through a
thousand photographs labeled with details. Id. at 394.
93
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967). Fifty-year-old Katz
superseded the prior Court rulings that defined “search” and “seizure” only in
physical terms. Under the Katz two prong expectation of privacy test, a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes place when the defendant
manifests an actual expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as
legitimate, justifiable, or reasonable. See id. at 353.
94
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
95
Id. at 2217–18.
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Amendment search because it violates the person’s “legitimate
expectation of privacy in the records of his physical
movements.”96
The Carpenter majority boldly rejected the
government’s arguments that people lose their privacy rights
when using these technologies. In doing so, the majority
reframed the third-party doctrine by limiting and departing from
a tradition of deference paid to the doctrine and declined to
extend it to cover CSLI.97
Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts raised concerns in dicta
about the current and future potential for abuse if the
government is able to collect a week or more of a person’s data
without having to show probable cause.98 He pointed out that
tracking historical cell-site records is much worse than GPS
monitoring and more invasive.99
Chief Justice Roberts’s
reasoning can be readily applied to Stingrays, which can identify
a person’s location within six feet, whereas CSLI location
information only identifies a person’s location within about a

96

Id. at 2217.
Id.; see Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter Decision,
LAW FARE BLOG (June 22, 2018), http://www.lawfareblog.com/understandingsupreme-courts-carpenter-decision. The Fourth Amendment safeguards should
apply whenever citizens convey personal information to a third party under the
promise of confidentiality; indeed the courts should “restore the Fourth Amendment
to its intended position as a mechanism for preserving those spaces in the face of
unprecedented technological, social, and political pressures.” STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 143 (2012). The Government argues that the doctrine
facilitates its ability to obtain information in criminal and terrorism investigations
via subpoenas, which unlike warrants, do not require a showing of probable cause.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 241. The government only needs to provide “specific and
articulable facts” to a court, showing the information is potentially “relevant and
material” to the criminal investigation. Id. at 245. Friedman suggests that law
enforcement should be required to demonstrate how its investigation would be
severely hampered before it is granted access to this private information held by
third parties. Id. at 257. This can be facilitated by transparent rules governing the
police’s use of new technology, created after public discussion and debate. Id. at 326.
98
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221–22; see also Mark Joseph Stern, Sotomayor,
Fourth Amendment Visionary: How the Supreme Court Vindicated the Justice’s
Prescient Theory of Digital Privacy, SLATE (June 24, 2018), http://slate.com/newsand-politics/2018/06/in-carpenter-v-united-states-the-supreme-court-vindicatesjustice-sonia-sotomayors-theory-of-digital-privacy.html (discussing Chief Justice
Roberts’s reliance in Carpenter on Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones as
reflected in his repeated citations to her concurrence).
99
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
97
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half-mile.100 As Professor Susan Freiwald and former federal
magistrate judge Stephen W. Smith recently wrote in the
Harvard Law Review:
The case for Fourth Amendment protection of cell site simulator
location data would seem even stronger than in Carpenter. The
data gathered by the cell site simulator is generated by law
enforcement, not the provider, and so the third party doctrine of
Miller and Smith is not even arguable here. Another problem
with the cell site simulator is the breadth of the area under
search.
Allowing a police van to troll the streets of a
neighborhood or town in order to locate a particular phone
raises the specter of an illegal general warrant. Perhaps for
these reasons it has been DOJ policy since 2016 to seek a Rule
41 warrant to authorize use of these devices. Based on such
legal and practical concerns, law enforcement use of cell site
simulators will in all likelihood be subject to the Fourth
Amendment.101

A similar outlook was embraced by one Florida appellate
court that extended Carpenter’s warrant requirement to a
cell-site simulator to suppress evidence gathered by a cell-site
simulator.102 Unlike the Patrick panel majority, this court saw
the true nature of cell-site simulators:
With a cell-site simulator, the government does more than
obtain data held by a third party.
The government
surreptitiously intercepts a signal that the user intended to
send to a carrier’s cell-site tower or independently pings a cell
phone to determine its location. Not only that, a cell-site
simulator also intercepts the data of other cell phones in the
area, including the phones or people not being investigated. If a
warrant is required for the government to obtain historical
cell-site information voluntarily maintained and in possession of
a third party, we can discern no reason why a warrant would
not be required for the more invasive use of a cell-site
simulator.103

Therefore, based on this analysis, one can reasonably
anticipate that the Court would require the government to get a
warrant before using a Stingray. Such a ruling would be a

100
THE CATO INSTITUTE, STINGRAY: A NEW FRONTIER IN POLICE SURVEILLANCE
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-809-revised.pdf.
101
Susan Freiwald & Stephen W. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A
Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 229 (2018) (emphasis added).
102
State v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d 986, 991–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
103
Id. at 991 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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natural extension of Carpenter. More importantly, the decision
would be congruent with the original purpose of the Fourth
Amendment.
C. Towards Mass Incarceration: Syncing Digital Surveillance
Technology with the War on Drugs
For the most part, legal scholars have analyzed the Court’s
surveillance cases solely for their legal precedent and analytical
framework about the government’s use of high-tech tools. Few
discuss them in a focused narrative about the use of unfettered
discretion by law enforcement in the urban “War on Drugs.”
Upon a closer examination, the associated themes of narcotics,
gangs, and race are at the forefront. First, Kyllo involved the
police using an infrared thermal imaging device to scan a
suspect’s home from a city street.104 The scanning revealed that
the roof over Kyllo’s garage was unusually hot—indicating to the
government that the suspect was growing marijuana under heat
lamps in the garage attic.105 Second, the respondent in Jones was
the owner and operator of a nightclub, who came under suspicion
of trafficking drugs and became the target of a federal and local
investigation.106 Jones was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base.107
Third, in the consolidated cases of Riley, Riley was stopped
by police officers for a routine traffic stop and subsequently
arrested after his car was impounded and firearms found.108 The
officers accessed information from his smart phone showing that
Riley was a member of a street gang.109 In its companion case,
Wurie was arrested for selling drugs after officers opened his
phone and accessed its call log, tracing the number to his
suspected apartment building.110 Fourth, bands of robbers in
Carpenter held up nine Radio Shack and T-Mobile cell phone

104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
Id.
United States v. Jones, 566 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
Id. at 403–04.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014).
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 373.
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stores, and Carpenter was apprehended after one of the suspects
gave police the names and cell phone numbers of his fifteen
accomplices.111
The defendants in those cases were fortunate to be
vindicated at the Supreme Court. But the vast majority of cases
in the mass incarceration pipeline never get that far. Starkly,
the war on drugs fueled the incarceration boom that has
culminated in approximately 2.3 million people confined in
federal and state prisons and local jails.112 According to the New
York Times, “[i]n 2010, more than 7 in 100 black men ages 30 to
34 years old were behind bars. The federal system alone holds
219,000 inmates, 40 percent above its capacity . . . .”113 Crack
cocaine violations are the most notorious enhanced penalty.
Michelle Alexander characterizes mass incarceration as a new
racial caste system and argues that addressing the disparity of
racial bias in crack sentencing “is just the tip of the iceberg”
because the caste system depends on the prison label affixed to
felons, not the time they served in prison.114 The felon label
precludes a felon from employment and access to housing, as well
as enjoying the privileges of citizens, such as voting and jury
service.115 “Those labeled felons will continue to cycle in and out
of prison, subject to perpetual surveillance by the police, and
unable to integrate into the mainstream society and economy.”116
Clearly these are the effects of mass incarceration.
III. RACE AND POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN A SURVEILLANCE
STATE
This section explores why better police accountability is
needed in a modern world that tries to balance the interests of
citizens wanting safe neighborhoods with the interest of the
police conducting investigations. It combines the analytical
111

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
See KARA GOTSCH, BREAKTHROUGH IN U.S. DRUG SENTENCING REFORM: THE
FAIR SENTENCING ACT AND THE UNFINISHED REFORM AGENDA 1 (2011),
https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/2011/FSA/WO
LA_RPT_FSA-Eng_FNL-WEB.pdf.
113
Editorial, Smarter Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.ny
times.com/2013/08/14/opinion/smarter-sentencing.html.
114
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 139 (2010); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social
and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1271, 1304 (2004).
115
ALEXANDER, supra note 114, at 191–94.
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Id. at 95–96.
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framework offered by Age of Surveillance and Unwarranted:
twenty-first century government surveillance involves technology
and a dramatic increase in “stop and frisks” in urban areas, with
aspects of critical race theory to better understand the gateway
to mass incarceration.
A.

Terry and Racial Profiling on the Streets

Every public defender grimaces at how, under Terry v. Ohio,
police officers may stop and search and conduct routine searches
and seizures under the guise of “reasonableness.”117 Officers
need only point to some objective facts or observations that are
sufficient to show reasonable suspicion under the circumstances;
afterwards, courts then assess the reasonableness of searches
and seizures from this objective point of view.118 Terry was a
landmark decision protecting defendants’ rights, but, in the
intervening fifty years, it has become increasingly unclear when
stops are permissible.
Today, officers have broad and completely unfettered
discretion to conduct searches and seizures, since the
requirement to demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing has been diluted very much since Terry. The police
can justify a decision to stop and frisk regardless of their true
motivation, and courts tend to give them the benefit of the
doubt.119 In addition, the many Fourth Amendment exceptions
the Court has carved out—such as those involving automobile
stops, immigration laws, administrative searches, collecting and
searching computer data, and DNA testing—have essentially
neutralized the Fourth Amendment.120
At bottom, Terry has been frequently used to support the use
of proactive stop and frisks by police with near impunity.121
Friedman describes the dilemma: (1) A person has no recourse if
they are not arrested, and (2) if a person is arrested and charged,
that person’s suppression motion will likely be denied given the
great deference paid to an officer’s justification for the stopping
117

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 198 (8th ed. 2007) (explaining “[t]he [Terry]
Court not only permitted stops and frisks on less than probable cause . . . it also
explicitly invoked the reasonableness clause over the warrant clause as the
governing standard”).
119
GRAY, supra note 3, at 279.
120
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 167–68.
121
See id.; GRAY, supra note 3, at 279.
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and frisking, along with the officer’s explanation for what
constituted articulable suspicion for the stop.122 As such, Gray
cautions that “leaving the power to conduct stops and frisks to
the unfettered discretion of law enforcement would threaten the
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”123 Indeed, “policing methods like stop and frisk
have grown out of control, subjecting hundreds of thousands of
innocent citizens to routine searches and seizures.”124
Any meaningful discussion of Terry and modern search and
seizure law must consider the intractability of race and the
Fourth Amendment. The connection between the historical
racial discrimination in American law enforcement and modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is strong. Carol Steiker
asserts the Framers did not foresee how industrialization would
spike racial animosity between black and white communities.125
Nor did they predict the evolution of racially divisive modern law
enforcement practices, and the Court’s attendant shift to
probable cause and the exclusionary rule.126
Surely police, emboldened by a lax Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence favoring them, are disproportionately stopping
persons of color more than white people.127 This practice is the
outgrowth from aggressive policing rooted in the forty-year war
on drugs that began with Richard Nixon’s 1971 professed
offensive against hard drugs, which continued through the 1980s
crack cocaine epidemic.128 Alexander argues:
The extraordinary racial disparities in our criminal-justice
system would not exist today but for the complicity of the
United States Supreme Court. In the failed war on drugs, our
122

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 154–56.
GRAY, supra note 3, at 279; see Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite:
Police Terror of Minority Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. LAW 57, 57 (2014)
(“Stop and frisk is, in the United States, a central site of inequality, discrimination,
and abuse of power.”).
124
GRAY, supra note 3, at 279.
125
Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
820, 839 (1994).
126
Id. at 844–45.
127
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 61–62.
128
See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
BLACK AMERICA 20 (2017) (explaining that the drug war began with Richard Nixon’s
1971 declaration of implementing “a new, all-out offensive” against hard drugs);
Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, War on Drugs, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
(Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-on-drugs (summarizing how the
federal government escalated the war on drugs during the crack cocaine epidemic of
the 1980s).
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Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures have been eviscerated. Stop-and-frisk operations
in poor communities of color are now routine; the arbitrary and
discriminatory police practices the framers aimed to prevent are
now commonplace.129

Set in this socio-historical-political context, Friedman’s
chapter “Discriminatory Searches” is especially engaging and
covers the controversy over the racial profiling of racial
minorities by law enforcement.130 Dubiously, courts have allowed
racial profiling as long as race is not the only factor for the
profiling.131 Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause is effectively overridden in Fourth Amendment
cases. Racial profiling is a byproduct of unconscious racial bias,
which is to blame for the pervasiveness of racial profiling, more
so than general intentional racism.132 But racial profiling is
ineffective as a policy because studies show that racial minorities
do not use or possess drugs more than white people do.133
Gray also addresses racial profiling. The thrust is felt in
Gray’s argument that stop and frisk programs are ineffective and
disproportionately target politically and economically vulnerable
communities of color facing routine threats of being stopped and
frisked.
“This is a circumstance wholly contrary to the
imperative command at the heart of the Fourth Amendment that
the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated.”134 Even if aggressive
stop and frisk programs were effective, they thwart the Fourth
Amendment’s goal of limiting government authority to conduct
searches and seizures.135 Aware of such concerns, Christopher
Slobogin, in a complimentary analysis, proposes a return to
Terry’s conceptual framework that is consistently and seriously
129
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010),
https://prospect.org/article/new-jim-crow-0; see also Paul Butler, The System is
Working the Way it is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO.
L.J. 1419, 1428–36 (2016) (describing the racial injustices articulated by the
Movement for Black Lives); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A
Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1485–508 (2016)
(listing factors which render African Americans vulnerable to repeated police
interactions, including policing practices, mass criminalization, racial stereotyping,
and racial segregation).
130
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 185.
131
Id. at 198.
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See id. at 197.
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Id. at 197 (citing to different studies conducted).
134
GRAY, supra note 3, at 276.
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enforced by courts with regards to all searches and seizures.136
The Court could lead the way by developing a multitiered
justification hierarchy with probable cause at the top, reasonable
suspicion in the middle, and relevance resting at the bottom.137
To
be
sure,
moving
beyond
the
limiting
totality-of-the-circumstances standard surrounding a police
encounter will allow a deeper understanding of racial profiling.
As a starting point, application of critical race theory to Fourth
Amendment cases and issues brings race to the surface, offering
insights about the power dynamics, attitudes, and behaviors
between the officer and the person confronted. Devon Carbado
and Daria Roithmayr heighten this analysis even further by
suggesting critical race theory can be applied along with social
science to show how African Americans are racialized as
criminals through media representation and popular discourse.138
Moreover, they question whether color-blind laws and social
policy purporting to be race neutral actually undermine the
interests of racial minorities.139 Such an approach considers the
realities of street policing.140
On this theme, critical race theorist Paul Butler describes
how police actually patrol poor black neighborhoods with
“violence” in the form of beating, killing, pepper spraying,
stopping and frisking, and handcuffing African American men.141
136
Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054–55 (1998).
137
See id. at 1053, 1081–85 (proposing a hierarchy of searches and seizures to be
used based on the proportionality principle).
138
See Devon W. Carbodo & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social
Science, 10 ANNU. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 151 (2014).
139
Id. These theories can be grounded by practical applications. For example, in
addressing systematic racial biases, the late San Francisco Public Defender Jeff
Adachi offered a blueprint for racial justice calling for the formation of in-house
racial justice communities, regional racial justice groups, implicit or unconscious
bias training, and community bridge building. See generally Jeff Adachi et al., A
Proposal to Achieve Racial Justice Through Enhancing the Work of Public Defense
Organizations Throughout the Country, BLUEPRINT FOR RACIAL JUSTICE,
https://sflawlibrary.org/sites/default/files/Racial%20Justice%20Blueprint_1.pdf.
Such efforts would address the overrepresentation of racial minorities in San
Francisco’s criminal justice system by raising racial justice issues in jury selection
and voir dire, bail charging, selective prosecution, racial profiling, and
sentencing. Id.
140
See Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounter”—Some Preliminary Thoughts
About Fourth Amendment Seizure: Should Race Matter? 26 VALPARAISO U. L. REV.
243, 248, 250, 252, 253 (1991).
141
See generally PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN
82–116 (2017).
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These examples of police misconduct were neatly encapsulated
for mainstream America through media accounts of the violent
killings of young African American men following the 2012
shooting of African American seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin
in Miami Gardens, Florida and the 2014 shooting of
eighteen-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.142 In
the following years, there was a slew of tragic deaths of young
black men and women at the hands of white police officers,
accompanied by the Black Lives Matter demonstrations
clamoring for police accountability.143 Concerning this, Butler
theorizes that police routinely harass and discriminate against
African Americans so they can be placed under government
surveillance.144
He states, “[S]top-and-frisk does not make
communities safer. Instead it causes many men of color to hate
the police, and makes them less willing to engage with the
government in any way . . . .”145
To supplement their academic discourse, Butler, Gray, and
Friedman separately analyze the New York City Police
Department’s (“NYPD”) use of stop and frisks, which was found
to be unconstitutional by Judge Shira Scheindlin in 2013.146 The
NYPD made 4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June
2012.147 As distilled from Judge Scheindlin’s robust opinion, over
eighty percent of those stopped were African American or
Hispanic, and only ten percent of those stopped were white.148
An equally damning statistic: fifty-two percent of the stops
included a protective frisk for weapons, and only 1.5% of the
frisks revealed a weapon.149 African Americans and Hispanics
were also more likely than whites to be subjected to the use of
force.150 Based on these findings, Judge Scheindlin concluded

142
See id. at 61; ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING:
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 21–24 (2017); see
also CNN, Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/index.html.
143
See BUTLER, supra note 141, at 61; FERGUSON, supra note 142. Those killed
included Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Freddie Gray, Laquan McDonald, Rekia Boyd,
Remnisha McBride, and Walter Scott. See JEFF CHANG, WE GON’ BE ALRIGHT:
NOTES ON RACE AND RESEGREGATION 127 (2016).
144
BUTLER, supra note 141, at 4, 8.
145
Id. at 96.
146
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
147
Id. at 556.
148
Id. at 556, 574.
149
Id. at 558.
150
Id. at 559.
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that the NYPD’s widespread practices of heightening police
enforcement on members of a racially defined group was
unconstitutional.151 Disappointingly, while there have been
fewer stops since the court’s decision, both the racial profiling of
African Americans and Hispanic and the aggressive policing of
minority communities continues.152
Notably, an especially illuminating aspect of Judge
Scheindlin’s decision was her discussion of the influence of
unconscious racial bias, an issue not often mentioned in court
opinions: “It would not be surprising if many police officers share
the latent biases that pervade our society. If so, such biases
could provide a further source of unreliability in officers’ rapid,
intuitive impressions of whether an individual’s movements are
furtive and indicate criminality.”153 Gray echoes that implicit
bias played a major role in the NYPD’s stop and frisk program—
a program that provides “a snapshot of stop and frisk policies and
practices across the country . . . .”154 He reasons, “[I]mplicit bias
probably accounts for much of the racial disparity in stop and
frisk programs. As products of our society, officers just naturally
look more closely at Black and Latinos citizens and are far more
likely to attribute nefarious motives to them and their actions.”155
B. Digital Surveillance Technology Policing 3.0 in a
Post-September 11th World
The war on drugs got a shot in the arm with the “War on
Terror.” After the September 11th attacks on America, federal
and local agencies began to work collaboratively under the
auspices of fighting the war on terror. Soon after, the Bush
Administration implemented policies allowing governmental
agents to execute arbitrary searches of laptops, cameras, cell

151

Id. at 562–63.
See Jenn Rolnick Borchetta et al., Opinion, Don’t Let the Police Wreck Stopand-Frisk Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/
10/opinion/police-stop-and-frisk-reforms.html (analyzing the court ordered reform
process for the NYPD to improve police discipline and supervision, and criticizing
potential opposition by police needed reforms while advocating three reforms:
(1) serious penalties for police misconduct; (2) issue of department smart phones for
accurate note-keeping; and (3) the creation of a citywide community oversight
board).
153
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 580–81.
154
GRAY, supra note 3, at 53.
155
Id. at 54.
152
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phones, or other electronic devices at this nation’s borders.156
The umbrella of “national security” allows the government to
obtain information about terror suspects from internet providers,
phone companies, banks, and credit reporting agencies without
any warrant.157
Some of this aggressive policing, which
Friedman calls “policing without permission,” is misguided
because it is executed largely in secret without oversight.158
These tools and strategies used by the government threaten the
Fourth Amendment’s safeguards.159 As a rejoinder, Friedman
wants oversight over police conducting warrantless searches and
discriminatory searches and proposes democratic policing of cops,
which requires legislators, the police, and courts working
together in collaborative reform efforts.160
Age of Surveillance and Unwarranted significantly overlap
most in their exploration of how racial discriminatory policies are
accomplished with technology.
At a broad level, police
departments across the country increasingly rely on predictive
policing, a method of crime-mapping in which data about
geographic areas is used to try to anticipate where crimes will
happen.161 Policing and investigations have been assisted by new
data technologies, algorithms, digitized facial recognition
technologies, social media scraping, data mining, person-based
and place-based predictive analytics, and reliance on big data.162
Big data is used to identify “predictive risk factors that correlate
with criminal activity.”163

156

See Daniel Victor, Forced Searches of Phones and Laptops at U.S. Border are
Illegal, Lawsuit Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/13/technology/aclu-border-patrol-lawsuit.html (indicating that the policy began
under the Bush Administration).
157
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 292–96; see also Charlie Savage, Congress
Approves Six-Year Extension of Surveillance Law, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/politics/surveillance-congress-snowdenprivacy.html (reporting that the Senate voted to extend the National Security
Agency’s surveillance program allowing the warrantless collection of emails, texts,
phone calls, and private messages from American companies, including AT&T
and Google).
158
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 16–17, 20.
159
See id. at 287.
160
See id. at 316–22.
161
See GRAY, supra note 3, at 38, 40, 264.
162
See FERGUSON, supra note 142, at 2, 4; see also Taslitz, supra note 88, at 125
(describing use of facial recognition technology by Florida police to survey a
downtown nightlife district).
163
FERGUSON, supra note 142, at 167.

352

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:325

This is how race comes into play. Predictive analytics, social
network theory, and data-mining technology appear race-neutral
on the surface, but can be based on factors that correlate with
race and class.164 More narrowly, data-driven policing means
aggressive police presence and surveillance, which manifests into
harassment against African Americans, immigrants, religious
groups, the poor, and protesters.165 Residents in high crime areas
who have frequent contact with police may be increasingly linked
to others in the same situation, potentially leading to an endless
loop of systematic bias by police associating individuals with
their neighborhoods, family, or friends.166 In the aggregate, this
reveals the explicit and implicit bias of big data that is consistent
with the racial history and systematic inequalities of American
policing.167
Consider the ShotSpotter, a digital policing tool that is
planted in high crime areas through strategically placed,
networked, powerful acoustic sensors connected to GPS.168 A
ShotSpotter automatically identifies the sounds of gunshots to
pinpoint an exact location and alert police to potential violent
crime before it is reported by human witnesses; such devices
have been deployed in high crime areas in Washington, D.C.,
Boston, Oakland, San Fransisco, San Antonio, and
Minneapolis.169 ShotSpotter sensors can also pick up outside
conversations, sounds, and other audio without the consent and
knowledge of individuals, which could be used in the
prosecution’s case.170 Just like Stingrays, Shotspotters are a new
technology that assists the government in sustaining the mass
incarceration machinery.

164
See id. at 103–04; see also Michelle Alexander, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminaljustice-reforms-race-technology.html.
165
See FERGUSON, supra note 142, at 5.
166
Id. at 56–57.
167
Id. at 131–32.
168
See SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2019).
169
Id.; see also Dean Weingarten, San Antonio Pulls the Plug on ShotSpotter
Gunfire Detection System, Hartford, CT Next?, THE TRUTH ABOUT GUNS (Aug. 21,
2017), http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2017/08/dean-weingarten/san-antoniopulss-the-plug-on-shotspotter-gunfire-detection-system-hartford-ct-next/.
170
See Suraj K. Sazawal, Is ShotSpotter Violating Your Fourth Amendment
Rights And You Don’t Even Know?, RIGHTS AND DISSENT (May 8, 2015),
https://www.rightsanddissent.org/news/is-shotspotter-violating-your-fourthamendment-rights-and-you-dont-even-know/.

2019]

BOOK REVIEW

353

IV. UTAH V. STRIEFF: ASSAULTING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND
ENABLING STINGRAY SURVEILLANCE
This section takes a procedural turn. As the Court pushes
back against police encroachment on the constitutional rights of
defendants in substantive Fourth Amendment surveillance cases,
the Court is also simultaneously whittling away at the Fourth
Amendment in its procedural rulings. For example, the police
can stop any individual they want based on the suspicion that a
crime is or was being committed. The Court’s far-reaching ruling
in Utah v. Strieff took a slice off of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule by allowing police officers to stop and question
citizens based on a hunch or whim that a criminal violation has
occurred.171
In Strieff, the Court ruled five to three in favor of the State
of Utah and held that contraband obtained over the course of an
illegal search did not violate Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights
and as a result was not subject to suppression under the
exclusionary rule.172 A Utah narcotics detective engaged in a
weeklong “intermittent” surveillance of a house based on an
anonymous tip left on a drug tip line about “narcotics activity” at
that specific house.173 He observed a number of people making
brief visits to the residence over the course of a week that made
him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs.174 Driving
an unmarked car, the detective followed Strieff from the
residence to a nearby lot and detained him, asking him what he
was doing at the house.175 After checking Strieff’s identification
through the police dispatcher, the detective learned of Strieff’s
171
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016); id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). The exclusionary rule applies when there is a substantial causal
connection between the illegal activity and the evidence offered at trial. See
SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 118, at 529. The Court has repeatedly declined to
extend the exclusionary rule. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009)
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when an isolated incident of police
negligence leads to an unlawful search); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 586, 599
(2006) (declining to apply exclusionary rule to a knock-and-announce violation); see
also David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment in the Fourth, 2006 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 283, 301 (2006) (criticizing the Court for “completely recast[ing] the
exclusionary rule as a narrow remedy that applies only when the evidence seized is
of the type that the constitutional protection was designed to protect”).
172
136 S. Ct. at 2064.
173
Id. at 2059–60.
174
Id. at 2057.
175
Id.; State v. Strieff, 286 P.3d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 357 P.3d
532 (Utah 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
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outstanding arrest warrant for an unpaid traffic ticket.176 A
baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were found
on Strieff during a search incident to arrest, and he was
subsequently
charged
with
unlawful
possession
of
177
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor responded to
Strieff’s claim that it was an unlawful investigatory stop,
conceding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for
stopping Strieff because the detective never saw Strieff enter the
suspected drug house or knew how long Strieff was there.178 The
State argued however, that even though there was no reasonable
suspicion for the stop, the valid arrest warrant attenuated the
connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the
contraband.179
The issue presented to the Court was whether the
attenuation doctrine applies where an unconstitutional detention
leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant.180 Writing for the
majority, Justice Thomas applied the Brown v. Illinois181
three-factor test to determine if the exclusionary rule applied
based on a substantial causal connection between the illegal
activity and the evidence offered at trial or whether the evidence
was sufficiently attenuated from the original warrant.182 He
concluded that: (1) “temporal proximity” between the initial
unlawful stop and the search favors suppressing the evidence
because the drugs were found on Strieff minutes after the stop;
(2) the “presence of intervening circumstances” strongly favors
the state because the valid warrant authorizing Strieff’s arrest
existed before his stop and was unrelated to the investigation of
the suspected drug house; and (3) there was no misconduct
because the officer only acted negligently, which did not rise to a
“purposeful or flagrant” violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment
rights.183 As Justice Thomas reasoned, “[T]here is no indication
that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent
176
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060; State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015),
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
177
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
178
State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536–37 (Utah 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2056
(2016).
179
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
180
Id.
181
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
182
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061–62.
183
Id. at 2062–63.
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police misconduct . . . all the evidence suggests that the stop was
an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in connection
with a bonafide investigation of a suspected drug house.”184
Perhaps to the chagrin of Justice Thomas, there is an
alternative interpretation of the facts to support the conclusion
that this was not a so-called “isolated instance of negligence.”
The remainder of this section offers a close reading of the
majority opinion, reveals its flaws, and concludes that Strieff
establishes a bad precedent that further empowers the great
unfettered discretion officers already have. First, the centerpiece
of the opinion’s infirmities is Justice Thomas’s misreading of
Brown, a case wherein the suspect made two inculpatory
statements after being arrested without probable cause and
being given Miranda warnings twice.185 At issue was whether a
Miranda warning sufficiently breaks the causal chain between
an illegal arrest and a confession.186 The Brown Court held that
there was no break because Miranda warnings, per se, cannot
make the act of confession a product of free will sufficient enough
to break the causal connection between the confession and the
illegal arrest.187
In comparison, there was no significant
intervening event analyzed in Strieff. Attenuation from the
discovery of the contraband came by the detective’s exploitation
of his own illegal conduct.188
Second, Justice Thomas erroneously construed the officer’s
conduct as not being “purposeful and flagrant” but as an “isolated
instance of negligence.”189
To the contrary, the detective
committed to a surveillance spanning a week, based not on a
reliable informant’s tip, but rather on an isolated anonymous tip
left on a caller hotline.190 As such, the stopping of Strieff was as
purposeful as the actions of the Chicago police officers who broke
into petitioner’s apartment in Brown.
There, the officers
searched Brown’s apartment and arrested him without probable
cause or a warrant, in order to question him in an ongoing
murder investigation.191 As Justice Blackmun, writing for the
184

Id. at 2063.
See Brown, 422 U.S. at 594–96.
186
Id. at 597.
187
Id. at 603–04.
188
See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064–65 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing how
“[i]n his search for lawbreaking, the officer in this case himself broke the law”).
189
Id. at 2063–64.
190
Id. at 2059–60.
191
See Brown, 422 U.S. at 592.
185
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majority in Brown, pointed out, “the illegality here . . . had a
quality of purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was
obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two
detectives . . . . The arrest, both in design and execution, was
investigatory.”192 Similarly, the same could be said of the
detective’s stopping of Strieff without reasonable suspicion; it
was a stop simply made for the purpose of embarking on a fishing
expedition, hoping to reel something in.
A fuller understanding is presented by Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent where she applied the same Brown factors to obtain an
opposite result: the officer illegally stopped Strieff and discovered
the drugs by “exploiting his own illegal conduct.”193 As to the
first Brown factor, Justice Sotomayor astutely recognized that
there was no time lapse since the officer performed a warrant
check immediately after stopping Strieff.194 Furthermore, there
was no intervening circumstance because Salt Lake County’s
enormous backlog of outstanding warrants was well known to
officers, and thus “the officer’s discovery of a warrant was not
some intervening surprise that he could not have anticipated.”195
Next, Justice Thomas misinterpreted Segura v. United
States196 and again, erroneously relied on an inapposite case to
support a contrary conclusion. Justice Kagan acknowledges as
much in a footnote in her dissent in Strieff:
[In Segura], [t]he Court . . . held that the Fourth Amendment
violation at issue “did not contribute in any way” to the police’s
subsequent procurement of a warrant and discovery of

192

Id. at 605.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2066–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
194
Id. at 2066.
195
Id. at 2067. Orin Kerr also critiques the majority’s use of the Brown factors.
See Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule is Weakened But It Still
Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/
06/opinion-analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/. The Brown
three-factor test, as used by Justice Thomas, is not a well settled doctrine as the
majority portrays it to be. Id. Kerr theorizes that the Court in Brown did not apply a
strict three factor test, but rather a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Id.
Moreover, he believes that an “intervening circumstance” should be considered “an
outside event that changes what is expected to happen.” Id. Thus, in Strieff, there
was no intervening circumstance because the police stop went according to plan; an
officer conducting a warrant check could expect a warrant to appear. Indeed, the
“existence of the warrant is only an intervening circumstance if you didn’t expect
Strieff to have a warrant out for his arrest.” Id. Finally, under the third Brown
factor, the burden of proof in establishing attenuation is on the government. Id.
196
468 U.S. 796 (1984).
193
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contraband. So the Court had no occasion to consider the
question here: What happens when an unconstitutional act in
fact leads to a warrant which then leads to evidence?197

In extrapolating Justice Kagan’s footnote further, Segura
appears to have relied on the independent source doctrine.
Specifically, the Court in Segura considered whether to supress
evidence procured during an illegal search when officers later
obtained a warrant predicated on probable cause free of the
information from the intital search.198
New York Drug
Enforcement Task Force agents relied on a tip and conducted
weeks-long surveillance over Segura’s apartment.199 They were
instructed to “secure” the premises to prevent the destruction of
evidence.200 Alarmingly, law enforcement agents forcibly entered
Segura’s
apartment,
without
requesting
or
receiving
permission.201 In dissent, Justice Stevens referred to the daylong police occupation of Segura’s apartment and surmised that
these facts epitomized the deterrence rationale behind the
exclusionary rule, and thus the evidence obtained should have
been excluded.202 The Segura Court declined to suppress the
evidence because “the illegal entry into petitioners’ apartment
did not contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized
under the warrant.”203
In contrast, the officer’s illegal conduct in Strieff did actually
contribute to the discovery of the evidence procured in the
search.204 Justice Sotomayor explained that the facts of the two
cases are markedly distinguishable:

197
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073 n.2 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Segura, 468 U.S.
at 815).
198
See Segura, 468 U.S. at 797–98.
199
Id. at 799–800. Bearing this in mind, Professor Joshua Dressler referred to
Segura decades earlier as a hurried, “inherently flawed,” and “unnecessarily weak”
decision. See Joshua Dressler, A Lesson in Caution, Overwork, and Fatigue: The
Judicial Miscraftsmanship of Segura v. United States, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375,
410–11 (1985). According to Dressler, that opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger
offered reasoning and a conclusion based only on implied legal authority pulled from
prior Court cases that were factually distinguishable. Id. at 405–07. Dressler asserts
that the case is the wrong precedent for addressing the issue of securing premises in
the absence of exigent circumstances. Id. at 411.
200
Segura, 468 U.S. at 800.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 836–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203
Id. at 815 (majority opinion).
204
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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[I]t is difficult to understand [the majority’s] interpretation. In
Segura, the agents’ illegal conduct in entering the apartment
had nothing to do with procurement of a search warrant. Here,
the officer’s illegal conduct in stopping Strieff was essential to
his discovery of an arrest warrant. Segura would be similar
only if the agents used information they illegally obtained from
the apartment to procure a search warrant or discover an arrest
warrant.205

It is worth noting that Justice Sotomayor is the only Justice
who mentioned Wong Sun v. United States206—the seminal “fruit
of a poisonous tree” case—when she explained that the guiding
principle of Wong Sun applied because that case turned on the
fact that police officers exploited their initial illegal search to
obtain tainted evidence.207 According to Justice Sotomayor,
“Wong Sun explains why Strieff’s drugs must be excluded. We
reasoned that a Fourth Amendment violation may not color every
investigation that follows but it certainly strains the actions of
officers who exploit the infraction. We distinguished evidence
obtained by innocuous means from evidence obtained by
exploiting misconduct.”208
Taking Justice Sotomayor’s cue, Wong Sun’s applicability
does deserve more attention. Wong Sun’s analysis should have
been used to resolve the issues in Strieff. At issue in Wong Sun
was whether the illegality of the evidence to which an instant
objection was made came about because of the illegality itself or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.209 The Wong Sun Court held that the narcotics
clearly came about from the exploitation of illegality, and thus
the statement made from an unlawful arrest may not be used.210
205

Id.
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
207
See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Wong Sun centered
on a series of warrantless drug busts in San Francisco involving Chinese American
defendants and Chinese American narcotics agents working undercover. Wong Sun,
371 U.S. at 472–76. Based on a tip that Wah Toy and Wong Sun entered into a drug
agreement to buy heroin, agents arrived at a laundry without obtaining an arrest
warrant. Id. After obtaining information from Wah Toy, the agents executed two
additional warrantless searches and only one of the searches turned up heroin. Id.
In addition to finding the heroin inadmissible because of its relationship to
unlawfully obtained tainted information, the Court for the first time applied the
“fruits of the poisonous tree” doctrine to exclude verbal statements. Id. at
487–88, 492.
208
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
209
See generally Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471.
210
Id. at 492.
206
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There are striking similarities between Wong Sun and
Strieff. The officers in Wong Sun wanted to make drug busts
without having to secure proper search warrants. They were
aware of what they were doing and acted intentionally in
searching the laundromat and residences. Their misconduct was
punished in the case because the evidence was excluded against
one of Wong Sun’s co-defendants.211 With that in mind, Strieff’s
exploitation was more like that in Wong Sun than that in Segura
because the officer in Strieff wanted to make a drug bust without
a warrant and intentionally stopped Strieff in the hopes that he
possessed contraband and had an outstanding warrant for his
arrest.
The officers however were not punished for this
misconduct, and the evidence was admitted into evidence just
because of the active warrant.
Yet incredibly, Justice Thomas disregards these key
differences and states that “the Court addressed similar facts to
those here and found sufficient intervening circumstances to
allow the admission of evidence.”212 Justice Thomas surmised
that the agents in Segura had probable cause to believe there
was drug dealing in the apartment and sought a warrant which
was not issued until the next day.213 With the warrant pending,
the agents entered the apartment, arrested an occupant, and
then discovered evidence of drug activity.214 Based on this shaky
premise, Justice Thomas asserted that Segura’s principles apply
in Strieff because in both cases, the connection between the
unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence was “sufficiently
attenuated to dissipate the taint.”215
Third, Strieff ignores the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule: the deterrence of unlawful police misconduct.
Facing this contradictory evidence, how could the majority find
that the officer acted in good faith? 216 Justice Kagan emphasized
this irreconcilable fact in her conclusion:
The majority chalks up Fackrell’s Fourth Amendment violation
to a couple of innocent “mistakes.” But far from a Barney Fifetype mishap, Fackrell’s seizure of Strieff was a calculated
decision, taken with so little justification that the State has
211

Id. The Court concluded that Wong Sun lacked standing to object because his
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Id.
212
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (emphasis added).
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 2063.
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never tried to defend its legality. At the suppression hearing,
Fackrell acknowledged that the stop was designed for
investigatory purposes—i.e., to “find out what was going on [in]
the house” he had been watching, and to figure out “what
[Strieff] was doing there.”217

The majority’s good faith contention is further skewered in
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, where she responded to the core
deficiencies in the Court’s analysis: “The officer found the drugs
only after learning of Strieff’s traffic violation; and he learned of
Strieff’s traffic violation only because he unlawfully stopped
Strieff to check his driver’s license.” 218
Strieff allows officers to retroactively claim grounds for
making an unconstitutional stop and circumvent the
exclusionary rule. In essence, Strieff allows police officers to stop
people to check for warrants, regardless of any belief of
wrongdoing.219 Stephen Saltzburg contends, “[Strieff’s] practical
effect might be to greatly enhance law enforcement incentives to
make ‘stops’ without the necessary reasonable suspicion and
might affect a large number of people.” 220 Put simply, if there is
no warrant, the suspect will be allowed to leave. If there is a
warrant, he can be searched incident to arrest and questioned
further.
This issue can arise in a Stingray surveillance case. Patrick,
discussed earlier in Part II, is a case on point. There, the
Seventh Circuit broadly interpreted Strieff as precluding the
application of the exclusionary rule.221 However, in her dissent,
Judge Wood argued that the panel majority unnecessarily
extended Strieff by failing to see that the facts were
distinguishable; the police got the arrest warrant, used the
Stingray to locate Patrick, and then found the gun in plain view
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during the arrest.222 From her point of view, the arrest warrant
was not an intervening cause and could not have attenuated any
potential taint.223
Lastly, while the Strieff majority opinion did not mention it,
the decision will have far-reaching effects on minority
communities. Citing to social science studies outside of the
record about the influence of race on criminal procedure,
including Alexander’s work on mass incarceration, Justice
Sotomayor was the only Justice to acknowledge the racial
realities of American society.224 She made insightful points about
the majority opinion, finding that the Strieff ruling “allows the
police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and
check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are not
doing anything wrong,” 225 enabling officers to arbitrarily target
citizens and racial minorities who are disproportionately
impacted.226 As discussed throughout this Review, this is just the
kind of twenty-first century policing that Gray and Friedman
vehemently oppose and warn readers about.
V. GPS MONITORING AND SUPERVISED PROBATION IN
WASHINGTON, D.C.
This closing section discusses the unfettered discretion
exercised by the MPD when embarking on indiscriminate
searches using Veritrax GPS records to look for potential
suspects who may be on supervised probation. This issue has
received scant attention because the increase in the number of
people on community supervision, or “mass supervision” through
probation and parole, is largely not given the attention that it
deserves.227
Akin to mass incarceration, supervised release also reflects
racial inequality: African Americans make up thirty percent of
those on probation or parole, most of whom were convicted of
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drug and property crimes.228 Because they are subject to
postconviction surveillance and court ordered rules, a third of
them will likely return to jail or prison for violating a myriad of
rules, including prohibitions on drug and alcohol use, having
contact with felons, failing to pay fines and fees, and disobeying
movement restrictions.229
A person on supervision in
Washington, D.C. is especially vulnerable to searches, because
unlike other jurisdictions, Washington, D.C. has no search
condition statute that puts supervisees on notice, and the only
warning provided is the ostensibly benign advisal that the
supervisees’ “movement will be tracked and stored as an official
record.”230 Plus, GPS monitoring is far more intrusive than a
search of a person or home because the MPD have real-time,
direct access to a database with up to twenty years of data.231
The MPD’s practice of circumventing the Fourth Amendment
by running random searches of the supervision data, and
importing specific names of supervisees to lock in their location,
stands at the new frontier of Fourth Amendment litigation. The
Public Defender Service successfully litigated this very issue in
United States v. Jackson, where the Superior Court of D.C. held
that the MPD violated Jackson’s Fourth Amendment rights when
it unlawfully searched Jackson’s GPS location information
without suspicion and absent any probation violation.232 The
MPD accessed Jackson’s GPS location information, maintained
pursuant to a GPS contract executed between Jackson and the
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”),
during their investigation of an armed robbery by two unknown
African American men.233
Without specifically identifying
Jackson, or even having witness accounts of seeing one of the
men wearing a GPS monitoring device, the MPD looked for
228
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anyone wearing a GPS monitor near the crime scene.234 The
MPD eventually captured GPS records showing all of Jackson’s
movements over multiple weeks, including movements in
Jackson’s private home.235 These records were used to track
down Jackson and another man at their home, which lead to the
finding of a black ski mask and an SUV that was tied to the
robbery.236
At the suppression hearing, the Government argued that
Jackson consented to be placed on probation, and thus consented
to the police searching his location data; he had no legitimate
expectation of privacy.237 The Government also asserted that the
“special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment allows
searches conducted without any ground for suspicion of
particular individuals in certain limited circumstances,238 and
thus the search was authorized. Defense counsel argued that the
search of Jackson’s GPS location information was a “fishing
expedition” done for law enforcement purposes.239 They stated
that though Jackson was placed on GPS supervision by CSOSA
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to track his whereabouts, that fact does not make it less of a
search, and that search must also be reasonable.240 Defense
counsel contended that:
CSOSA completely frustrated the purpose of the Privacy
Act . . . by granting MPD unfettered access to its GPS database.
MPD did not follow the Code’s procedure . . . . Instead, MPD
ran a general search into a CSOSA’s database, without any
information as to whether anyone placed on electronic
monitoring was a suspect of the offense.241

CONCLUSION
In the end, Age of Surveillance and Unwarranted are terrific
books that reveal the lack of clarity in current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to emerging technologies.
The idealistic authors successfully present a prescription on how
to nurse an ailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Gray
argues that the text and history of the Fourth Amendment
provide effective constitutional remedies and would be effective
in meeting contemporary threats if they are taken seriously by
courts and law enforcement agencies. Along a similar line,
Friedman contends that the collective dimension of the Fourth
Amendment should be taken seriously to ensure the collective
security of the people. The burden now rests on the people to
take action. We must demand more transparency of police
surveillance and be allowed to participate in the decisionmaking
process regarding how surveillance technology is used. We must
also require more police accountability and better training for
officers and judges so that they can understand the influence of
the unconscious biases that we all have. Unquestionably, these
goals must be met if we are to protect privacy rights and slow
down the continual erosion of the Fourth Amendment.
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